imtoken will never ask for your seed phrase, private key or verification code. Always review the address, network and request details before transferring, signing or approving.
Security center

Security

Security is explained around practical decisions rather than isolated terminology. This guide connects seed phrases and private keys remain under the user’s control, official personnel will not ask for seed phrases, private keys, or verification codes, and recovery material is safer when kept offline with minimal copies with the steps a user can verify before and after an on-chain action.

seed phrases and private keys remain under the user’s control

For Security, keep recovery phrases and private keys under your own control, and pay particular attention to malware can replace copied addresses in the clipboard. Review the address, network, contract, amount, and permission scope before signing or transferring; third-party DApps and smart contracts can introduce additional risk.

On this pageCore principle: Seed phrases and private keys remain under the user’s controlCommon risk scenarios: Recovery material is safer when kept offline with minimal copiesHow to recognize the issue: Before signing for a DApp, verify the domain and request detailsWhat to do next: Public computers and public Wi-Fi increase environmental riskBuild a repeatable check: Malware can replace copied addresses in the clipboard

Core principle: Seed phrases and private keys remain under the user’s control

Focus on official personnel will not ask for seed phrases, private keys, or verification codes

For Security, start by viewing “seed phrases and private keys remain under the user’s control” alongside “official personnel will not ask for seed phrases, private keys, or verification codes” in one concrete workflow. They describe different layers of the decision: one tells you what object or state you are dealing with, while the other tells you what still needs verification. Interface labels are useful, but they should be backed by network, address, contract, or permission information that can be checked independently.

In practice, “recovery material is safer when kept offline with minimal copies” and “before transferring, verify address, network, and amount” can appear one after another without meaning the same thing. Record the active account and network first, review the address, amount, contract, or request summary next, and then verify the result with a transaction hash, block status, or contract state. That sequence ties the wallet interface back to public chain data instead of relying on a single screen.

  • Confirm seed phrases and private keys remain under the user’s control.
  • Check how official personnel will not ask for seed phrases, private keys, or verification codes affects the current request.
  • Use recovery material is safer when kept offline with minimal copies as a separate verification point.

Common risk scenarios: Recovery material is safer when kept offline with minimal copies

Focus on before transferring, verify address, network, and amount

A durable way to use Security is to understand why “recovery material is safer when kept offline with minimal copies” changes the next decision rather than memorizing button locations. “before transferring, verify address, network, and amount” adds a second checkpoint; when those signals disagree, stop and verify the source before moving forward. Familiar branding or layout is not a substitute for checking the network, account, contract, and exact request.

Once “before signing for a DApp, verify the domain and request details” is placed in the workflow, use a prepare–review–execute–verify sequence. Prepare by checking the device and entry point, review the account and network, execute only after reading the signature or transaction details, then use “before approving, verify spender, token, and permission scope” as part of the final verification. If the state is still unclear, avoid creating new transactions simply to test what happened.

  • Confirm recovery material is safer when kept offline with minimal copies.
  • Check how before transferring, verify address, network, and amount affects the current request.
  • Use before signing for a DApp, verify the domain and request details as a separate verification point.

How to recognize the issue: Before signing for a DApp, verify the domain and request details

Focus on before approving, verify spender, token, and permission scope

When Security involves “before signing for a DApp, verify the domain and request details”, the important question is what that item can change and what it cannot. “before approving, verify spender, token, and permission scope” may be a state indicator or a prerequisite for a later action, so it should be read in the context of the active network and account. Any request that can sign, approve, or transfer value deserves a separate review even when the surrounding interface looks familiar.

To verify the outcome, begin with “public computers and public Wi-Fi increase environmental risk” and use “remote-control requests can expose screens and actions” as a second source of evidence. Public addresses, networks, transaction hashes, and contract information are appropriate for troubleshooting; seed phrases, private keys, and verification codes are not. A website or supposed support agent asking for those secrets should be treated as a reason to stop.

  • Confirm before signing for a DApp, verify the domain and request details.
  • Check how before approving, verify spender, token, and permission scope affects the current request.
  • Use public computers and public Wi-Fi increase environmental risk as a separate verification point.

What to do next: Public computers and public Wi-Fi increase environmental risk

Focus on remote-control requests can expose screens and actions

In real use, “public computers and public Wi-Fi increase environmental risk” often appears together with “remote-control requests can expose screens and actions”, but the two should still be checked independently. One account can be used across several networks and DApps, and similar address formats do not make the underlying chain state identical. Separating network context, asset identity, and permission scope reduces mistakes caused by look-alike information.

After the action, “malware can replace copied addresses in the clipboard” can guide the next check while “on-chain transactions generally cannot be reversed by the wallet alone” provides another verifiable clue. On-chain transactions generally cannot be reversed by the wallet alone, so careful review before confirmation is more useful than trying to repair an avoidable mistake afterward. Third-party DApps and smart contracts also carry their own technical and operational risks.

  • Confirm public computers and public Wi-Fi increase environmental risk.
  • Check how remote-control requests can expose screens and actions affects the current request.
  • Use malware can replace copied addresses in the clipboard as a separate verification point.

Build a repeatable check: Malware can replace copied addresses in the clipboard

Focus on on-chain transactions generally cannot be reversed by the wallet alone

For ongoing use of Security, build a repeatable record around “malware can replace copied addresses in the clipboard” and periodically review whether “on-chain transactions generally cannot be reversed by the wallet alone” still matches your current intent. Many apparent wallet problems are actually changes in account, network, contract, or permission context. Keeping those contexts explicit makes it easier to distinguish a display issue, a network wait, and a genuine on-chain state change.

If “seed phrases and private keys remain under the user’s control” looks wrong, do not immediately overwrite the situation with a new signature or transaction. Check “official personnel will not ask for seed phrases, private keys, or verification codes” first and use public chain data to establish what has already happened. When asking for help, share only the minimum public information needed for diagnosis; recovery phrases and private keys should remain under the user’s control.

  • Confirm malware can replace copied addresses in the clipboard.
  • Check how on-chain transactions generally cannot be reversed by the wallet alone affects the current request.
  • Use seed phrases and private keys remain under the user’s control as a separate verification point.

Practical checklist

  • Review seed phrases and private keys remain under the user’s control.
  • Review recovery material is safer when kept offline with minimal copies.
  • Review before signing for a DApp, verify the domain and request details.
  • Review public computers and public Wi-Fi increase environmental risk.
  • Review malware can replace copied addresses in the clipboard.